Third World Legal Studies
Volume 14 The Governance of Internal Security Forces
in Sub-Saharan Africa

Article 7

1-7-1997

Human Rights and the Legal Structure of Security
Forces in Constitutional Orders: The Case for
Ethiopia
James C.N. Paul

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls

Recommended Citation
Paul, James C.N. (1997) "Human Rights and the Legal Structure of Security Forces in Constitutional Orders: The Case for Ethiopia,"
Third World Legal Studies: Vol. 14, Article 7.
Available at: http://scholar.valpo.edu/twls/vol14/iss1/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Valparaiso University Law School at ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Third World Legal Studies by an authorized administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information, please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LEGAL STRUCTURE
OF SECURITY FORCES IN CONSTITUTIONAL
ORDERS: THE CASE OF ETHIOPIA*
James C. N. Paul"
This contribution consists of a paper presented to the
Constitutional Commission of the Transitional Government of
Ethiopia (TGE) in Addis Ababa in August 1993, at its invitation. In it
I suggested that the Commission might well pay some attention to the
law governing the "structure" of the "security forces" in Ethiopia's
future constitutional order.
The Commission was explicitly charged with the task of producing
a draft Constitution which would establish "democracy" and "human
rights"-and a "rule of law" to secure these conditions.' This general
mandate was underscored by Ethiopia's recent ratification (without
reservations) of the International Bill of Rights and other major human
rights instruments including the UN Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
As a first phase of its work, the Commission held a number of
public sessions featuring discussions of a wide variety of subjects. In
these sessions certain general themes regularly recurred, notably
discussions of three interrelated tasks:

*A longer version of this paper was published in 5 William and Mary Bill of Rights Journal 235
(1994). That piece contains detailed footnote annotations to the text, as well as a lengthier discussion of
the military in Ethiopia's constitutional and political history.
.'During 1962-1969, the author served as founding Dean of the Law School of
Haile Sellassie
University (now the University of Addis Ababa) and (during 1967-69) as Academic Vice President of that
institution). During 1970-74 he served as a consultant to the President of that University. During the
period 1991-95, he returned to Ethiopia at the invitation of the Transitional Government on various
missions and, on a number of occasions, was invited to participate in public seminars sponsored by the
Constitutional Commission.
' The TGE was legally established by the Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, which is effect,
the interim constitution of a government created to lead the country towards full democracy."
Transitional Period Charter of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 1, NEGARIT GAZETA, July 22, 1991. The
Commission was charged with preparing a draft Constitution to be submitted to an elected Constitutional
Assembly for amendment, adoption and promulgation.
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1. How to build and empower a civil society and civic culture
which will increasingly value and nurture democratic (notably
participatory) systems of governance;
2. How to decentralize and devolve powers of government in a
multi-ethnic polity in order to satisfy alleged ethnic group demands for
"self-determination."
3. How to develop governmental institutions and processes that
will promote democratic processes and protect human rights in all
realms of governance.
In this context, I expressed surprise that so little attention had been
focussed on the policies and strategies needed to "restructure" and
"reconstitute" the army, police and other security forces. This subject
seemed to us to be of urgent importance for reasons noted below in the
paper which I was asked to prepare, and which follows.

SECURITY FORCES IN ETHIOPIA'S FUTURE

THE SECURITY FORCES IN ETHIOPIA'S
FUTURE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER

A Working Paper Prepared for the Constitutional Commission
August 1993

The TGE (i.e. Transitional Government of Ethiopia) has charged
the Commission with the task of preparing a Constitution that will
establish institutions and processes necessary to establish democratic
governance and the protection of universally recognized human rights.
Presumably the Commission will carefully apply this mandate to all of
the basic organs of government which the Constitution must create or
authorize the legislature to create. Each of these must be put under a
particular body of law that will enable and obligate it to promote and
protect human rights and the principles of a democratic system of
governance.
The military, police, and other law enforcement organizations-all
of the " internal security forces" (ISFs) must be seen as basic organs of
government, in many ways just as important as the executive,
legislature, and courts, possibly, in light of Ethiopian history, more so.
Thus, it seems necessary for the Commission to identify those
principles necessary to put the security forces under a rule of law
designed to assure their commitment to democracy, human rights and
the Constitution. This paper addresses that task.
Part I sets out some principles, derived from the International Bill
of Rights and other basic, international human rights instruments
which Ethiopia has now ratified-principles which should (in my view)
be used to develop both constitutional provisions and legislation
governing all future security forces of the country (including those of
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An appended,
the proposed regional and local governments).
2
suggestive, draft code spells out these ideas in more detail.
Part II focuses on the importance of this task in view of both the
unhappy history of the role played by military and police in the
governance of Ethiopia in the past, and the current, urgent need to
reconstitute them, tabula rasa, including, most important, the need to
adopt their governance to the positive roles which ISFs must play in
the processes of democratization and development over the coming
years.
Part III suggests some strategies that the Commission might
employ to address these difficult tasks in framing a draft Constitution.
I.

Identifying the Basic Principles Which Should Govern The
Security Forces in a Democratic Constitutional Order

The International Bill of Rights 3 (to which Ethiopia is now
committed) is more than a Charter of basic rights. It is also a
significant source of constitutional principles that help people
everywhere to define "democracy" as a system of government and to
structure governmental institutions committed to the interrelated tasks
of democratizing governance and protecting rights.
These principles also help us to define the character of organs of
government necessary to sustain a democratic system irrespective of
whether the Constitution creates a Presidential, Parliamentary or some
other, novel form of government. Thus they call for creation of
institutions of government which will promote andprotect:
A.' Respect for the sovereignty of the people - secured, in part, by
establishing the supremacy of a constitution which is derived from the
fullest exercise of direct rights of political participation and "self2

See The Draft Code of Universal Principles reprinted elsewhere in this volume.
I.e. The Universal Declaration and the two Covenants (which Ethiopia had recently ratified).

Article I of the Transitional Period Charter, the "interim Constitution" (cited in Note I) appears to have
incorporated the Universal Declaration and guaranteed "the right to engage in unrestricted political
activity,I including rights of *freedom of expression, association and assembly.I
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determination"-a constitution that expresses the "will of the people,"
and that provides for the continuing opportunities to express that
"will."
B. Participationin all spheres of governance - secured through
recognition of a wide array of "political" rights including freedom of
association, assembly, speech and press; rights to vote and participate
in free electoral processes; rights of access to responsible officials in
all agencies of government in order to present grievances, demands
and proposals, or to seek information; rights to redress violations of
the Constitution and hold all organs accountable to standards of
governance prescribed by law.
C. Representation in governance - secured not only through
popular exercise of rights of "participation" and rights to free and fair
elections and a "representative" legislative organ, but also through
respect for rights of concerned groups to present, on a continuing
basis, their concerns and grievances to relevant agencies of
government and to have these fairly heard; and rights of communities
of the poor, and of women and persons of different ethnic, cultural or
religious backgrounds to enjoy equal access to both employment and
positions of power in all organs of government, and to secure fair
representation of their interests in all organs of government.
D. Administration which respects due process of law - secured not
only through a Bill of Rights but through legislation which creates
processes that require each organ of government to hear claims
challenging the legality of its policies and institutional behavior, or the
legality of individual actions of its personnel, and through laws which
empower courts or other tribunals to impose adequate remedies where
these claims are shown to be valid and unredressed by the wrongdoing
agencies;
E. Equality of opportunity for all elements of the population to
participate in all spheres of governance - secured not only through
respect for rights of all persons - notably women - to enjoy equal
access to positions of government, but also through appropriate actions
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to remove historic patterns of discrimination practiced against them in
the recruitment of all public services, including the ISFs.
F. Transparency in the conduct of governance - secured through
the imposition of obligations to conduct lawmaking, adjudicatory and
regulatory proceedings in public; obligations to make and preserve
prescribed records of official actions and to make these readily
available to the public; and obligations imposed on designated officials
in all organs of government to disclose information to the press and
public and explain decisions affecting particular citizens or groups, or
the country as a whole.
G. Free, fair and frequent elections - secured through rights of
peoples to demand fair enforcement, by impartial agencies of
government (notably the security forces), of laws designed to assure
the peaceful, democratic character and integrity of all stages of the
electoral process - from campaigning to ballot counting, from rights of
access to the media to access to the courts to secure preventive and
protective remedies for victims of abuse of electoral processes.
H. Imposition of accountability on all officials who violate these
principles - secured through recognition of rights of people to demand
the disciplining, removal and imposition of criminal and civil liability
on all officials who violate prescribed standards - with appropriate
powers and duties vested in the courts and other departments of
government to enforce these sanctions.

I. Respect for the Constitution and the Rule of Law as
transcendent obligations imposed on all officials - secured by
requiring solemn commitments from all public officials to support the
Constitution and obey the law as overriding obligations of their office,
and through processes of recruitment, training and application of codes
of conduct and other methods which emphasize loyalty to these
principles above all other loyalties, including loyalties owed to the
regime in power or to one's party, patron or superior.
If these human rights commitments are taken seriously, they will
be reflected in all bodies of law which provide for the establishment,
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organization, governance
government.

and accountability

of all organs of

So a key problem confronting the Commission is how to adapt and
apply these prescriptions to the security forces.
The first step may be to work out a general framework of
principles which in turn can be used to draft: (i) provisions of the
Constitution relating to the security forces (ii) the basic legislation (to
be enacted at a later point) providing for establishment of these forces,
organization, finance, management and oversight of these forces, and
for required standards governing their recruitment, training, discipline,
transparency and accountability; (iii) regulations promulgated by the
relevant ministries and commanding officers of security forces to
adapt and implement these legal commands to the work of the army,
police and other law enforcement agencies, including those charged
with "surveillance" duties. Viewed in this light, the proposed
framework of principles can be seen as a projection of a most
important part of Ethiopia's future constitutional order.
The appended draft of such a code is intended to supply such a
framework. This draft code is not offered as an idiosyncratic
statement of personal preferences.
Rather the effort is to use
provisions of existing international human rights law as the source of
the universal principles proposed, to show that international law calls
for the code proposed. In addition to the International Bill of Rights,
the draft code draws on other UN Conventions and international
instruments adopted unanimously by the UN General Assembly which
set out standards necessary for humane law enforcement (such as the
UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers).
These
instruments were supported by Ethiopia in the UN, and, in view of this
Commission's mandate and its keen interest in implementing human
rights, they may deserve high visibility in Ethiopia's future
constitutional order.
The draft code (attached) addresses a number of subjects, including
the following:
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A. The fundamental mission of the security forces. These forces
should not simply be created to provide for "law enforcement" in the
abstract, nor to preserve the "security" of the "state" through blind
obedience to the commands of the government of the day. The
overriding obligation of all law enforcement should be to protect,
preserve and honor the Constitution and all laws enacted pursuant to it.
B. Legislative control. In a democratic society the power to
establish (and abolish) organize, empower (and limit powers) and
finance all security forces must reside in the elected legislative branch.
To that end the legislature must also enjoy continuing powers to
investigate and review the activities of all units in order to maintain its
(and the people's) sovereignty over them.
C. Judicialcontrol. The courts must be adequately empowered to
hear and determine all cases alleging abuses of power by the security
forces, to impose civil and criminal remedies on wrongdoers and,
where necessary, to provide other remedies requiring institutional
action to correct systemic failures or abuses by particular units. These
powers of judicial control should in no way preclude (or deter) the
legislature (and the executive) from discharging their obligations to
review and remedy systemic abuses and other faults in the governance
or operation of security forces. But a basic commitment to the rule of
law as the means to secure human rights implies that the courts must
enjoy final powers to require enforcement of the law when other
organs fail to do so.
D. Executive control. The civilian chief executive (and his/her
ministers and other delegates) should enjoy powers of command over
the security forces, but these powers must be exercised in accordance
with the limitationsimposed by the Constitution and legislation,andin
accordance with the mandates of the legislature and to accountable
executive control enforced by the review powers of the courts. This
concept of power should replace the historic notion that executives
exercise exclusive and autonomous executive control. "Civilian
control" should never be simplistically equated with the exclusive
control of a civilian executive, even if he or she is elected to office.
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E. Codes of conduct. The legislature should enact a fundamental
law prescribing both the standards of conduct expected of every person
in the various security forces and the processes to enforce these
standards. This legislation could require the relevant ministries to
implement the legislature's standards by promulgating more detailed
codes of conduct tailored to the task of each of the various security
forces - for example a code tailored to the tasks and powers of
surveillance units. One purpose of these codes is to impose strict
discipline not only on those who violate the code, but also on superior
officers who appear to condone violations of it, or negligently fail to
detect them. A second is to use the code as a basic element in the
training and orientation of all ranks - a point that may be crucial to the
reorientation of Ethiopia's future security forces.
F. Recruitment, training and orientation. These processes - as
already suggested - must reflect commitments to the principles of
equality of access and opportunity, to the duty to protect the
constitutional order and to educate all persons in respect to its
commands and to the commands of the relevant codes of conduct. It
should be emphasized that women certainly have an equal stake in the
reform of the security forces and in the manner of their governance;
therefore, recruitment to all ranks must be open to them. So, too, in
the Ethiopian context, the national security forces, must obviously be
recruited from all ethnic groups with equal opportunities to attain the
highest ranks.
G. Transparency. Security forces must be required to keep - and
make available to the public - prescribed records, such as records of
arrests, detentions and, indeed, of all other activities which plainly
affect the rights of particular individuals or groups. Designated
officials must be available to the public to answer questions regarding
these operations and all other matters of legitimate public concern. Of
course there are problems of defining subjects that can be kept secret,
at least temporarily; but the presumption should favor transparency.
H. Liability, criminal and civil. Liability must be imposed on all
ranks for violations of codes of conduct or violations of any other laws
that result in palpable abridgments of guaranteed rights. Defenses
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such as "obedience to superior orders," "state necessity" or "ignorance
of the law" must not be recognized except in regard to mitigation of
penalties. Conversely, superiors must be held liable for the wrongs of
inferiors whenever they have been negligent in terms of oversight or
lax in enforcing codes and discipline. Unconditional amnesty or
"impunity" must be forever forbidden-the Constitution itself should
enshrine that prescription.
I. Empowering civil society. The law governing security forces
should enable the press and other interested civil society groups to
monitor the governance and conduct of the security forces - and to
demand accountability for unlawful actions in accordance with the
principles set out above.
II.

The Importance of These Principles in the Light of the
Ethiopian Experience

Cynics or critics may suggest, of course, that all this is aspirational
and academic - that the enactment of these laws cannot effectively
change the ways of armies, police and unscrupulous political leaders
who use force to gain or maintain power.
There are several answers to these kinds of naysaying. The need
for principles is not academic. It is based on both the requirements of
international human rights law and on lessons of past experience and
present necessity: the past abuses of rights by the army and police in
Ethiopia; the present fact that all recognize that steps must now be
taken to reorganize Ethiopia's security forces in fundamental ways as
part of the transition; the fact that this reorganization will provide a
unique opportunity not only to reorient, re-educate and retrain these
forces, but to restructure and reconstitute them in legal terms; the fact
that the security forces have crucial, positive roles to play in
promoting the promised transition and the fact that this transition will
be flawed and put at risk unless the security forces are governed by a
rule of law grounded in human rights and democratization principles.
Military force, including lawless violence, surely looms large in
the history of the creation, governance and political economy of the
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modern Ethiopian state. At times, as is well known, Emperor Haile
Sallassie depended on his armies to secure, retain and extend his
powers, and one of his achievements in modernizing government was
the development of a large, well-trained, national military
establishment and a national police. But the size of these, coupled
with their autonomy from both civil government and civil society,
seemed to lay the foundations for military intervention as the
Emperor's power inevitably waned.
Under the Constitutions of 1931 and 1955 the Emperor not only
commanded the armed forces and police, but he retained exclusive
powers to determine their size, organization and cost; to establish the
law governing their organization and discipline; to decree emergency
powers and martial law, and to deploy security forces, as he deemed
necessary, to assure the "integrity of the Empire." These powers were
elaborated by various executive legislative instruments promulgated
over the years, though much of the detailed law governing the security
forces was unrevealed to the public. This body of law can be
characterized in general terms as follows:
A. Centralized executive control - exercised directly by the
Emperor and by ministers and officers who, in turn, were appointed
and dismissed by him;
B. Autonomy - in the sense that, subject to the control of the
Emperor, the security forces were largely left free to govern
themselves in accordance with their own regulations;
C. Insulation from and lack of accountability to civil society - in
the sense that governance of both the police and the army were - for all
effective purposes - beyond the reach of Parliament and the courts, and
enjoyed a defacto (if not dejure) immunity from the civil law; and
D. The Absence of Law - in the sense that rules requiring respect
for human rights, obedience to the rule of law and the Constitution
hardly figured in the professional codes governing the security forces,
nor in their training and system of discipline.
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Experience suggests that the combination of these, and related,
characteristics helps to create conditions within the security forces
which lead to politicization and intervention when the government of
the day weakens, and then to sustained, lawless military rule based on
force and systemic repression, and to all the other abuses which
ultimately attend rule by the "barrel of a gun."
Legal autonomy for the security forces often breeds a sense of their
social and political apartness from civil society. The very fact that
members of security forces live, to some extent at least, in a distinct
society of their own, isolated from the people they are supposed to
protect, creates risks of potentially hostile relationships with the
public. These risks are increased when the suppression of political
discontent becomes a major internal security preoccupation of the
ruling regime, and when leaders of the security forces come to believe
that civil society is infested with elites and other groups who are
ideologically suspect because they seem to be hostile to the regime in
power. Thus, professionals, intellectuals, students and other particular
groups (including ethnic groups) come to be seen (by the security
forces) as potential "enemies" to be carefully watched, repressed by
overt force and controlled by terror, methods if necessary. The
legitimacy of this kind of use of force against fellow citizens is more
readily assumed by soldiers and police when their training and leaders
appear to condone it, and when the powers of civil society to protest
(and the legal system to prevent) abuses and control the police and
military are weak.
Systemic use of force, particularly in the context of a large,
pluralistic country, may breed recourse to force as the only apparent
means to oppose an authoritarian regime. Recourse to the politics of
violence and civil warfare is, indeed, a very venerable theme of
Ethiopian history. Certainly widespread civil warfare became the
inevitable response to the brutal rule of the Derg, and this civil warfare
has, perhaps, now generated ethnic and other divisions within society
which could threaten the unity of the state if the administration of
public order is not seen to be fair and principled. The tasks of
restoring not simply "security," but popular confidence in, and support
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for, the new constitutional order may depend in part on the legitimacy
accorded to the future security forces in the processes of transition.
Indeed, the immediate need to reconstitute the security forces has
been recognized by the TGE as a task of central importance-important
because, de facto, the TGE is, itself, a military regime even though it
struggles to escape that contradiction by operating de jure under the
transitional "constitution" (the Charter) as a civilian government.
The army's leadership is also said by some to operate as an
"eminence grise" in the non-transparent, ruling circles of both the
ruling party (the EPDRF) and the government. This apparent
conversion of the army into an instrument of authoritarian rule whether fact or alleged fact - has (it has been said) undermined the
credibility and legitimacy of the TGE. I am referring to the heavyhanded way in which it moved to disarm and disperse the paramilitary
units of other "liberation front" parties in earlier stages of the
transition, and to the policing of elections of the regional governments
in 1992 and to the sometimes violent way it has put down other
disturbances. These methods could undermine the future positive role
that the army and police must play in securing the integrity of future
elections.
Moreover, the TGE's army is hardly now a representative
organization in demographic and ethnic terms, and, obviously, the
attempt to police the entire country by an army largely composed of a
minority ethnic group is fraught with risks, particularly if there is no
law establishing control over the operations, finance, and
accountability of these forces.
These concerns are reflected in a candid, thoughtful, paper
apparently prepared under the aegis of the Ministry of Defense for the
February 1993 Bujumbura Regional Conference on "Democratization
in Africa: The Role of the Military."4 The paper makes these points:

4 See Tsadkin Gebre Tensae, "The Unique Experience of Army-Building in Ethiopia, (February 1993)
which was revised and presented as "A Vision of a New Army for Ethiopia, at the Inter-Africa Group' s
"Symposium on the Making of the New Ethiopian Constitution,* May 21, 1993 (Addis Ababa).
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(1) in a democracy, civil society must enjoy an ultimate power to
govern the army; (2) the army must be a truly national army composed of people from all regions and ethnic groups, so that all
elements of the population will see it as "their" army; (3) insofar as the
army engages in local, "internal security" operations, it should enlist
the "participation" of affected people in concerned communities in
devising appropriate strategies to protect them; (4) the army must be
completely separated - and disengaged - from politics and the
competition of political parties; (5) the army must be under the control
of, and accountable to, all civil organs of government; and (6) the
overriding mission of the army must be to sustain the country's
Constitution, and its loyalties must be rooted in that objective.
These points take on particular force when considered in the
context of the transition yet to come in Ethiopia. Obviously, the
promulgation of a new constitutional order will not, by itself, produce
the goals aspired. In realistic terms, a transition must be seen as a
long, difficult period. Quite possibly the introduction of democracy
and competitive politics will also introduce a time fraught with
dangers of rather unprincipled political conflict, attempted wrongdoing
by party zealots and abuse of rights in contested elections - civil
disorders which could blight the prospects of democracy. The
privatization of Ethiopia's massive, inefficient state sector (a Derg
legacy), even if governed by humane policies, may impose hardships
on workers, leading to protests and strikes. Economic hardships
coupled with the disruption of civil authority during the collapse of the
Derg may have created new problems of urban crime and rural
banditry. The proposed creation of "ethnic federalism" (i.e. regional
governments deliberately constitutional along ethnic lines) may
generate recourse to the politics of violence or vengeance in some
parts of the country. The inevitable migrations of peoples from one
area to another may increase pressures on land and risks of new forms
of ethnic conflict. Finally there is, unfortunately, the always serious
risk that, at some future point, the regime of the day may, if it feels
beleaguered, seek to convert the security forces into an instrument to
maintain its political ascendancy, a step which often leads to outright
military rule.
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These and perhaps other undesired scenarios must surely be
anticipated in planning the reconstitution of the state, including its
security forces. The Constitutional Commission may be confronted
with both an urgent need and a unique opportunity to develop a new
body of law governing the organization and governance of the future
security forces, envisioning police and soldiers better trained and
disciplined to deal with foreseeable emergencies by building public
confidence in their commitment to democracy and human rights.
Indeed, if the security forces cannot preserve order through methods
that are seen by the public to be fair and lawful, if they use the abusive
and brutal methods of the past, they may easily contribute to the
subversion of democracy by undermining popular faith in the
possibilities and utility of the goals proclaimed by the Constitution.
Conversely, confidence in the possibilities of democracy can be
strengthened, perhaps greatly, to the extent there is a public belief that
those entrusted with police powers can be held accountable to civil
society, through legislative oversight, the courts, the press and other
processes of political participation. As the TPLF's own civil war
experience in Tigray demonstrates, techniques can be devised to
enable dialogue between the army and the communities it polices. So,
too, there can be dialogue with the public at large over security
concerns. This fundamental orientation, if clearly mandated by the
law, may help to deter the efforts of power hungry politicians to seize
or exercise illegal powers, or the efforts of others to resort to the
traditional politics of violence.
III. Strategies for Developing and Implementing the Principles.
Obviously, it is not enough simply to formulate aspirational
principles concerned with the governance of security forces. The
principles must be translated into specific legislative commands
reinforced and implemented by detailed regulations. Further, this "law
in the books" must be given visibility and the public must be
encouraged to demand compliance. Achieving these goals is a
formidable task confronting those responsible for projecting the new
constitutional order.

THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES - 1996-97

Several suggestive strategies for promoting these goals are briefly
outlined here. They are directed towards:
A. The processes employed to develop public participation in the
making of the new constitutional order.
It has been emphasized by the Prime Minister that the new
constitutional order must reflect a popular consensus developed
through extensive public participation in its making. The principles
embodied in the International Bill of Rights calling for selfdetermination and a legal order based on the will of the people require
this kind of participation. Indeed, if the new Constitution is to be
promulgated in the name of the people of Ethiopia, an emphasis on the
processes used to create it may be just as important as the work of
drafting the final product.
One way to enlist participation is to encourage full discussion of
widely shared public grievances concerned with past and present
modes of governance - grievances to be redressed by the new
constitutional order. The very processes of addressing historic
grievances may help to create a popular understanding that the new
constitutional order can be seen as a resource for the people, as
something which they can use to define, defend and promote widely
shared social interests, as a law empowering the people to demand
protection against recurrence of the abuses of the past. In this context
discussion of new ways to organize, govern and impose accountability
on the police and other security forces may be a matter of great interest
to ordinary people.
B. The processes employed to reorganize, re-orient and re-train the
security forces.
Over the past year in Ethiopia there have been several conferences
and seminars focussing on the need to provide "human rights
education" for governmental bodies.
However, it may be doubtful that "human rights education" in the
abstract produces a very real impact on official behavior. If the
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purpose of this "education" is to change behavior and "cultures," the
education attempted must be fully integrated with the rules of conduct
actually used to govern all agencies, certainly the security forces; and
the system of discipline must be geared to enforce those rules of
conduct.
A central purpose of training must be to secure
understanding of, and obedience to, the commands of the law that
governs them. Training and discipline - education and the inculcation
of new values and loyalties - must all be seen as interrelated,
interdependent means and ends.
All this underscores the importance of mandating not only codes of
conduct and discipline grounded in human rights law to govern all
ranks of the security forces, but mandating a system of continuing
education designed to give effect to the codes.
C. Techniques which the Constitution Commission can use to
elaborate principles which will put the security forces under the
Rule of Law.
While a "short-form" Constitution may be desirable, a democratic
order and the full protection of rights and the effective rule of law can
only be established if the Constitution is implemented, and its
principles reinforced, by various bodies of legislation elaborating its
different provisions. In the absence of these bodies of law, the
constitutional order will be incomplete and unenforceable. So, too, the
work of the Commission might itself be regarded as flawed if it failed
to elaborate in more detail the content of the constitutional order
envisioned by the Constitution proposed.
The Commission cannot easily prepare drafts of all the legislation
needed to create the new constitutional order it desires. But it can
provide directions and guidance for that purpose to the future
legislature. This guidance might take the form of a Report indicating
the kinds of laws that must be put in place to complete the
establishment of a new constitutional order. Alternatively, guidance
could be provided, and action mandated, by including in the
Constitution a body of Directive Principles which call upon the future
government to adopt legislation addressing subjects of major, enduring
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concern and which set out basic principles to be secured through that
legislation.
Directive Principles have been incorporated in some constitutions
in a form which gives them an effect similar to a preamble. In this
approach, the Directive Principles are cast in the form of abstract,
aspirational goals of social justice to which the state is pledged. These
kinds of Directive Principles usually are treated as unenforceable by
the courts, and often they are written in such general and inflated terms
that they carry an uncertain meaning. Thus, they enjoy little legal
effect.
Another way to use Directive Principles is to cast them in the form
of specific commands to the future government to enact legislation on
designated subjects which will incorporate designated principles
deemed crucial to the ongoing development of the future constitutional
order. In this approach the Directive Principles provide an important
framework for the further development of the constitutional order, a
set of imperative directions for the next government.
Further, the courts can be specifically empowered to use these
principles for guidance in constitutional interpretation and to enforce
them by appropriate judicial decrees in the absence of legislation.
Directive Principles of this character have the virtue of providing a
map depicting steps that must be taken to complete the constitutional
transition. They also provide a text that can be used by public leaders
and activists in the ongoing processes of developing that kind of
popular civic education and political participation which may be
essential to sustain the transition over time.

The appended draft "code" was prepared on the assumption that
the principles of the kind prescribed by it are mandated by
international human rights law. Experience the world over surely
suggests that we should no longer tolerate unregulated police or armies
as autonomous organs of government. Putting them under a rule of
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law may be a task of the highest priority to those committed to the
cause of building human rights and democracy.

